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On the never-ending road to Brexit:
perspectives for the European Union –





At the time of  publication of  this special issue, 17 months have passed since UK PrimeMinister Theresa May notified the European Council of  the UK’s intention to
withdraw from the EU. This decision was based on less than 52 per cent majority of  votes
cast for leaving the EU, in a non-binding referendum, which represented about 37 per cent
of  the votes of  those entitled to participate. For reasons entirely particular to the UK voting
system, this moved a Parliament with a majority for remaining in the EU before the
referendum to consistently supporting the government in its aspiration to leave the EU.1
However, when it comes to how exactly the UK should leave the EU there is less
agreement. The government has drawn stark lines in the sand, of  course. One, ‘Brexit’
does not, actually, mean Brexit as a shorthand for ‘British exit from the EU’. Instead, the
UK government plans to withdraw those parts of  the UK whose population has
endorsed remaining in the EU out of  the EU as well – this includes Northern Ireland,
rendering ‘Brexit’ a misnomer. Second, withdrawal from the EU will also mean
withdrawal from the Internal Market – or at least the part where people gain rights to
move and be treated equally in the UK – as well as the liberation from the jurisdiction of
the Court of  Justice of  the European Union (CJEU). While this so-called ‘hard Brexit’
will harm the UK citizens economically, especially in the North of  England, Scotland,
NILQ autumn 2018
*     The special issue resulted from the conference ‘Brexit – 15 Months On’ in September 2017 at Queen’s
University Belfast. This conference was funded by the project Tensions at the Fringes of  the European 
Union – Regaining the Union’s Purpose (TREUP), through Jean Monnet Centre of  Excellence 
by the European Commission (Project Number 564869-EPP-1–2015–1-UK-EPPJMO-CoE). For 
some more immediate impressions of  the conference, consult
<https://blogs.qub.ac.uk/tensionatthefringes/2018/02/01/academic-conference-brexit-15-months-on-
socio-legal-perspectives-for-the-eu-and-europe>.
1     For example, the government had no difficulty in securing a majority for the European Union (Notification
of  Withdrawal) Act, (2017) <www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2017/9/pdfs/ukpga_20170009_en.pdf> only
days after the UK Supreme Court found that Parliament, not government, must take this decision (R (Miller)
v Secretary of  State for Exiting the European Union [2017] UKSC 5), nor failed to win parliamentary approval for
the EU Withdrawal Act, which ends the viability of  EU law in the UK as supranational law along with the
authority of  the CJEU and subjects most EU law to withdrawal by government regulation, reserving a
parliamentary decision for only a few elements. 
Wales and Northern Ireland,2 this is unlikely to stop Brexit. For many, leaving the EU has
become an emotional necessity,3 partly related to a perceived English or British identity
imagined as alien to ‘Europe’ or resulting from peculiar imaginations of  sovereignty.4
The overall rationale of this issue
There is, of  course, a good chance that the UK, after experiencing the reality outside the
EU, returns to the fold in the future. However, this will depend on whether the EU
emerges stronger from this withdrawal, which is closely connected to its recurrent crises
over the last decade. Next to the UK’s idiosyncratic reasons to withdraw from the EU,5
those voting in favour of  withdrawal also voiced more general concerns. Research
frequently highlights a general discontent with underfunding of  municipal services,
deterioration of  the economic situation and high unemployment or insecure employment
conditions in certain regions, as well as anxiety around migration, estrangement from the
EU institutions, and a perception that EU integration is an elite project, responsible for
many ills of  everyday life.6
Some of  these sentiments are partially owed to the unique situation in the UK, which
does not as a rule allocate tax income to regions in relation to tax revenue or necessary
expenditure for public services.7 If  coupled with longstanding austerity politics, this may
result in more negative impact on public services than in other Member States. Some of
the sentiments are not, however, unique to the UK, even though they do not prompt
citizens in other EU Member States to reject continued EU membership for their country.
For example, anxieties around arrival of  EU citizens from abroad are part of  a growing
unease with migration in a number of  EU Member States, resulting in a surge of  support
for right-wing populist parties in many. Some Member States’ governments, notably
Poland and Hungary, have already started to dismantle guarantees conventionally
associated with liberal justice.8
Further, the EU’s reactions to the global economic crisis, which mainly resulted in
demanding that Member States reduce spending, preferably for social policy, and reform
their employment laws, have resulted in an increase of  socio-economic hardship in many
Member States. Whether this hardship is rightly or wrongly blamed on the EU, its increase
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2     See the detailed references in John Doyle and Eileen Connoly, ‘Brexit and the Northern Ireland Question’, in
Federico Fabbrini (ed), The Law and Politics of  Brexit (Oxford University Press 2017).
3     See Annette Bongardt and Francisco Torres, ‘A Qualitative Change in the Process of  European Integration’,
in Nazaré da Costa Cabral, José Renato Gonçalves and Nuno Cunha Rodrigues (eds), After Brexit: Consequences
for the European Union (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 102–27, 105–8, who relentlessly expose how the British
electorate (minus the Scottish, and of  course the Northern Irish) drifted towards supporting an ever harder
Brexit between the referendum and the 2017 election.
4     Marlene Wind, ‘Brexit and Euroscepticism. Will “Leaving Europe” be Emulated Elsewhere?’ in Fabbrini (n 2)
219–46, 229–33.
5     See, for example, Anand Menon and John-Paul Salter, ‘Brexit, Initial Reflections’ (2016) 92(6) International
Affairs 1297–318; Wind (n 4); Joseph H H Weiler, ‘Brexit: No Happy Endings’ (2015) 26 European Journal
of  International Law 1–7.
6     For an early post-referendum overview, see Sara Hobolt, ‘The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided
Continent’ (2016) 23 Journal of  European Public Policy 1259–77; with hindsight, see John Curtice, ‘Why
Leave Won the UK’s EU Referendum’ (2017) 55 Journal of  Common Market Studies 19–37.
7     For a comparison of  redistribution through taxes in the EU, see Anna Iara, Wealth Distribution and Taxation in
EU Member States (European Commission 2015); for an assessment of  whether free movement of  persons
actually results in strains on public services (and exposing that such strains are notoriously overestimated in
the public), see Klára Fóti, Social Dimension of  Intra-EU Mobility: Impact on Public Services (Eurofund 2015).
8     Laurent Pech and Kim Scheppele, ‘Illiberalism Within: Rule of  Law Backsliding in the EU’ (2017) 19
Cambridge Yearbook of  European Legal Studies 3–47.
constitutes a challenge to the EU’s raison d’être: the creation of  the Internal Market (alias
Common Market between 1957 and 1992) was never an aim in itself. Instead, the all-
dominant economic integration served the purpose of  improving the living and working
conditions throughout Europe. If  significant parts of  the EU citizenry perceive EU law and
politics as failing in this endeavour, the Union itself  suffers from a serious crisis of  identity.9
All this indicates that Brexit can be viewed as a symptom for a substantive crisis of
the EU. This view contrasts with the presentation of  the EU’s perils as three successive
crises:10 the first of  those was the global economic crisis emerging from volatile
governance of  the financial sectors in the USA (epitomised by the Lehmann Brothers
bank crash in 2007), as well as some EU Member States, including the UK and Ireland.
The second one was triggered by the surge in persons seeking refuge in Europe as a
consequence of  the ‘Arab Spring’ and the subsequent war in Syria from 2015, which again
resulted from US and UK interventions in the region. Brexit is partially portrayed as an
independent third crisis of  potential escalating disintegration. The global financial crisis
had repercussions in the EU of  necessity, which exposed – depending on one’s political
standpoint – the weaknesses of  the Eurozone based on the diversity of  its constituent
economies (lack of  ‘optimal currency area’) or based on the incompleteness of  economic
and political integration achieved by the Maastricht Treaty due to hesitancy, among others,
of  the UK.11 The surge of  refugees culminating in 2015 has exposed the difficulty of  the
EU to command Member States’ solidarity within the framework of  EU law.12 Instead of
portraying Brexit as a crisis in its own right,13 it can also be viewed as but one expression
of  Euroscepticism caused cumulatively by the Eurozone crisis and the surge in
refugees.14 While all these debates on individual crises have merit, we suggest that the
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9     See on this Dagmar Schiek, ‘Towards more Resilience for a Social EU: The Constitutionally Conditioned
Internal Market’ (2017) 13 European Constitutional Law Review 611–40.
10   Often referred to as ‘triple crisis’, e.g. James Caporaso, ‘Europe’s Triple Crisis and the Uneven Role of
Institutions: The Euro, Refugees and Brexit’ (2018) 56 Journal of  Common Market Studies 1345–61.
11   See on this from socio-legal and interdisciplinary perspectives, Dagmar Schiek (ed), The EU Economic and Social
Model in the Global Crisis: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Ashgate 2013); Kaarlo Tuori and Klaus Tuori, The Eurozone
Crisis: A Constitutional Analysis (Cambridge University Press 2014); from the perspective of  political economy,
see Peter Hall, ‘Varieties of  Capitalism in Light of  the Euro Crisis’ (2018) 25 Journal of  European Public
Policy 7–30; from the perspective of  political science integration theory, Arne Niemann and Ioannou
Demosthenes, ‘European Economic Integration in Times of  Crisis: A Case of  Neo-Functionalism?’ (2015)
22 Journal of  European Public Policy 1–23. There are a number of  recent expositions of  macro-economic
critique of  the Eurozone law and practice, for example, Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan, ‘Introduction: Is
the European Union Capable of  Integrating Diverse Models of  Capitalism?’ (2018) 23 New Political
Economy 145–59 and further articles in this special issue (guest eds Alison Johnston and Aidan Regan). 
12   See from legal perspectives recently Christina Molinari, ‘The EU and its Perilous Journey through the
Migration Crisis: Informalisation of  the EU Return Policy and Rule of  Law Concerns’ (SSRN 2018)
<http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3171983>; from international human rights perspectives see Rachael
McNeilly, ‘Common European Asylum System: Contradictions and Crises’ (2017) 4 Carleton Review of
International Affairs 54–65; from sociological perspectives, see Nick Dines, Nicola Montagna and Elena
Vacchelli (guest eds), ‘Special Issue: Migration and Crisis in Europe’ (2018) 52 Sociology 439–625; from the
perspective of  political science on both those crises, Tanja Börzel and Thomas Risse, ‘From the Euro to the
Schengen Crises: European Integration Theories, Politicization, and Identity Politics’ (2018) 25 Journal of
European Public Policy 83–108 and Philippe Schmitter and Zoe Lefkofridi, ‘Using Neo-functionalism to
Understand the Disintegration of  Europe’ in Hideko Magara (ed), Policy Change under New Democratic Capitalism
(Routledge 2016) 171–200. 
13   Ben Rosamond, ‘Brexit and the Problem of  European Disintegration’ (2016) 12 Journal of  Contemporary
European Research 865–71.
14   Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak, ‘Putting Brexit into Perspective: The Effect of  the Eurozone and
Migration Crises and Brexit on Euroscepticism in European States’ (2018) 25 Journal of  European Public
Policy 1194–214.
withdrawal of  a Member State – even a notoriously reluctant one – illustrates that the
individual crises of  the EU add up to more than their sum, and suggest a deeper crisis of
the EU,15 relating to its substantive constitutional aims. If  that is the case, the EU not
only needs to administer the first ever withdrawal of  a Member State in a measured
manner, not impacting more than necessary16 on relations with its stroppy North-
westerly neighbour poised to enhance perceived competitiveness through a deregulation
campaign.17 There is also a necessity of  reacting more fundamentally, and to refocus the
EU on facing the future challenges of  ecological and socio-economic sustainability while
also re-engaging with its citizenry. Since the EU remains a project based on integration
through law,18 the medium and long-term plans for responding to this situation will have
to be grounded in its legal order, without neglecting the societal and political
embeddedness of  law. This special issue tackles this challenge with a focus on the
substantive law of  the EU, asking whether and how the EU should react to Brexit. It does
so based on the idea that it is from the fringes of  the EU that the need for change can
best be observed. Accordingly, the issue assembles authors from Ireland (North and
South), Finland, Poland and the UK (although with origins in Germany and Greece).
Alongside debates on the future of  EU citizenship, and environmental and social policy,
the articles also discuss aspects of  the rule of  law crisis in Poland and perspectives of  the
EU’s break-up for the island of  Ireland. This selection is far from eclectic, as it addresses
core aspects of  the future of  the EU as well as the challenges emanating from its Eastern
and Western fringes. 
The never-ending flood of Brexit literature – socio-legal scholars
Brexit has been a godsend for academia in the UK and beyond, as it created the
opportunity for intensive research and publication activities. As a result, much ground has
been covered already. Nevertheless, we humbly submit that we add to the existing socio-
legal literature. 
Initially, socio-legal reflections were justifiably focused on the consequences that
Brexit will have for the UK, summarising the consequences of  severing the bonds
resulting from more than 40 years of  legal integration. Considering whether the slogan
‘Britain Alone’ could become viable in the twenty-first century,19 the crème of  British and
Irish constitutional and public lawyers delivered the verdict that it would become very
complicated, to say the least, and pose severe constitutional problems. At the same time
the collection reflects on potential causes of  Brexit, identifying the ‘often haughtily
detached decisions’20 of  the CJEU and the ‘Death of  Social Europe’21 as particular
problems. This book does address the substantive law of  the EU, but is mainly focused
on the reflections within the UK prior to and beyond its withdrawal. Similarly, the 2016
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15   This is also indicated by Ben Rosamond, ‘Brexit and the Problem of  European Disintegration’ (2016) 12
Journal of  Contemporary European Research 865–71; Schmitter and Lefkofridi (n 12).
16   As demanded by those supporting the liberal project of  free trade, e.g. Jo Weiler, ‘The Case for a Kinder,
Gentler Brexit’ (2107) 15 International Journal of  Constitutional Law 1–8, 1–4.
17   Thomas Sampson, ‘Brexit: The Economics of  International Disintegration’ (2017) 31 Journal of  Economic
Perspectives 163–83.
18   See the contributions in Daniel Augenstein, ‘Integration through Law’ Revisited: The Making of  the European Polity
(Ashgate 2012). For a critical assessment, see further Kaarlo Tuori, European Constitutionalism (Cambridge
University Press 2015).
19   Patrick Birkinshaw and Andrea Biondi (eds), Britain Alone! The Implications and Consequences of  United Kingdom
Exit from the EU (Kluwer 2016).
20   Maria Kendrick, ‘Judicial Protection and the UK’s Opt Outs: Is Britain Alone in the CJEU?’ in ibid §9.01
21   The title of  Keith Ewing’s chapter in ibid. 
collection of  short sections on Brexit by the European Law Review22 mainly focuses on
consequences for the UK internal order, while identifying that the EU will need to engage
in some fundamental reflection.23 Also, the consequences of  Brexit on Economic and
Monetary Union, alongside the role of  austerity policies triggered by the EU’s handling
of  the Eurozone crisis are reflected upon.24 A 2017 edited collection is explicitly
dedicated to identifying legal and policy challenges in the UK after Brexit, offering a wide-
ranging presentation and analysis of  relevant areas.25 It should be added that all three
publications also expose specific considerations for the UK’s devolved regions: Northern
Ireland, Scotland and Wales.26 The elevated position of  EU citizenship rights, both in the
perception by the EU and UK courts before any referendum was ever announced, and in
the EU negotiation strategy, have been brilliantly analysed by Elspeth Guild, pursuing the
hypothesis that a rights-based conceptualisation of  citizenship must seem as a
monstrosity to those used to the status-based concept of  British nationality. Again, this
book is firmly based on an UK-centred perspective.27 A critical internal perspective is also
taken up in monographic length, but through a series of  short essays in Brexit Time,28
attempting to explain to the legally informed reader ‘what the hell is happening next’.29
Armstrong expands his approach later towards predicting in how far the UK will pursue
the contrasting policies of  regulatory alignment with or diversification from the EU.30
With the Brexit process moving on, socio-legal analysis proceeds as well, starting to
go beyond the focus on the UK itself. Da Costa Cabral et als’ collection of  contributions
by legal, political science and economic scholars31 explores the consequences of  Brexit
for the EU, not the UK. Bongardt and Torres urge the reader to accept Brexit as a reality,
and forgo indulgence in phantasies that it may not happen.32 The main ambition of  this
volume is to predict the pragmatic legal consequences, such as regarding Brexit as a force
majeure in relation to contractual obligations and to pragmatically develop different
scenarios that could play out, such as developing models for social security coordination
with the UK in the future.33 There are also some normative elements, such as demanding
a serious discussion of  which society the EU integration process should promote. 
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22   See the introduction by Jukka Snell, ‘Editorial – Brexit: The Age of  Uncertainty’ (2016) 41 European Law
Review  445–6.
23   Anthony Arnull, ‘Broken Bats’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 473–4.
24   Alicia Hinarejos, ‘Brexit and the Euro Area’ (2016) 41 European Law Review 478–80.
25   Michael Dougan (ed), The UK after Brexit. Legal and Policy Challenges (Intersentia 2017).
26   See the chapters by Gordon Anthony on Northern Ireland, Stephen Tierney and Katie Boyle on Scotland, and
Mike Varney on Wales in Birkinshaw and Biondi (n 19). See also David Edwards and Niamh Nic Shuibhne,
‘“While Europe’s Eye Is Fix’d on Mighty Things”: Implications of  the Brexit Vote for Scotland’ (2016) 41
European Law Review 481–3, on Scotland, alongside Dougan’s chapter on the Irish border and Hunt’s chapter
on devolution in Dougan (n 25).
27   Elspeth Guild, Brexit and its Consequences for UK and EU Citizenship: Or Monstrous Citizenship (Brill & Nijhoff
2016).
28   Kenneth Armstrong, Brexit Time. Leaving the EU – Why, How and When? (Cambridge University Press 2017).
29   ‘Brexit – What the Hell Is Happening Now?’ is the title of  a journalistic exposure of  the Brexit phenomenon
aimed at a lay audience which has already seen its second edition: Ian Dunt, Brexit: What the Hell Happens Now?
(2nd edn, Canbury Press 2018).
30   Kenneth Armstrong, ‘Regulatory Alignment and Divergence after Brexit’ (2018) 25 Journal of  European
Public Policy 1099–117.
31   Da Costa Cabral et al (n 3).
32   Bongardt and Torres (n 3).
33   Yves Jorens and Grega Strban, ‘New Forms of  Social Security for Persons Moving between the EU and the
UK?’ in da Costa Cabral et al (n 3) 268–313.
Similarly, a 2018 University College London publication34 strives to rethink the future
of  Europe in shorter contributions by legal and political science scholars. Eight chapters
address the consequences of  Brexit for the UK and some other Member States and
dependencies; four confront the future of  the EU institutions; and six address EU
constitutional questions, including how EU citizens will fare in the UK and vice versa, and
the future of  EU democracy. Further chapters attempt to predict the impact of  Brexit on
the euro area, and the EU’s governmentality at large, while three more cover the EU’s
external policies. The three concluding chapters address the idea of  Europe, and thus go
to the ideational future of  the EU. 
Federico Fabbrini’ s 2018 edited collection35 constitutes a combination of  fact-finding
chapters and those pursuing a classical liberal vision of  the future EU. Based on
intergovernmental liberalism, Kalypso Nicolaïdis36 sets the tone in theorising Brexit as
yet another (legitimate) move of  the UK to defend its control in a narrow conservative
sense, a move which ultimately safeguards equilibrium. Catherine Barnard37 carries this
over into the realm of  the Internal Market, scolding the EU for refusing to grant the UK
a permanent exception from applying free movement of  workers while still being part of
the Internal Market. Uwe Puetter38 proposes that the EU reconsiders the institutional
balance, ensuring that the political weights are readjusted in order to achieve the ‘control
and equilibrium’ proposed by Nicolaïdis. Member States, writes Puetter, ‘cannot escape a
paradoxical attitude towards integration, namely that they seek closer integration without
supranational empowerment’,39 rendering Franco-German leadership as demonstrated
during the Euro crisis40 as problematic in the future in the absence of  a British
counterweight. Fabbrini41 adds in his own chapter that the EU should take Brexit as an
opportunity to ‘fix . . . problems’,42 and proposes institutional reforms to enhance the
democratic legitimacy of  the Eurozone alongside the creation of  a Eurozone budget.43
The contribution of this issue
While at first sight it seems a daunting enterprise to endeavour adding anything to this
rich literature, on closer inspection, some gaps emerge. As we have seen, the Brexit debate
is frequently focused on the UK and the future special relationship between this state and
the EU. Even the two collections which, as per their titles, aspire to develop perspectives
for the EU,44 contain a substantive amount of  debate focusing on how the UK can cope
in the end with leaving the EU. While this certainly is very relevant, Bongardt and Torres
refreshingly state a simple truth: ‘Brexit is a priority for the UK. For the EU, it is a major
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34   Benjamin Martill and Uta Staiger (eds), Brexit and Beyond. Rethinking the Futures of  Europe (University College
London 2018).
35   Fabbrini (n 2).
36   Kalypso Nicolaïdis, ‘The Political Mantra: Brexit, Control and the Transformation of  the European Order’ in
Fabbrini (n 2) 25–48.
37   Catherine Barnard, ‘Brexit and the EU Internal Market’ in Fabbrini (n 2) 201–18.
38   Uwe Puetter, ‘Brexit and EU Institutional Balance: How Member States and Institutions Adapt Decision-
making’ in Fabbrini (n 2) 247–66.
39   Ibid 252.
40   Ibid 254.
41   Federico Fabbrini, ‘Brexit and EU Treaty Reform: A Window of  Opportunity for Constitutional Change?’ in
Fabbrini (n 2) 267.
42   Ibid 268.
43   The views on Brexit and Economic and Monetary Union have also been published in Federico Fabbrini,
‘Brexit and the Reform of  Economic and Monetary Union’ in da Costa Cabral et al (n 3) 128–47.
44   Da Costa Cabral et al (n 3); Martill and Staiger (n 34).
and costly distraction from important common challenges.’45 This truth must not,
however, distract from the fact that the UK’s withdrawal must be used as an chance to
improve. Most importantly, the Union should use the opportunity to address popular
discontent with its integration project on the one hand, and on the other hand tackle the
thorny problem of  coordinating policies which cannot stop at geographical borders
through constructive engagement with the UK as a non-integrated close neighbour. 
Both these necessities require engagement with the EU’s substantive policies, rather
than merely addressing institutional and governance issues. Because the EU continues to
be a community of  law, those socio-economic and political challenges should be
addressed in socio-legal categories rather than exclusively as policy issues. The mission of
this special issue is thus highly relevant, and not yet completed in other publications. In
line with the main discontent with the EU, and the major problems which defy
governance within the convenient constraints of  secured borders, three partly interrelated
themes emerge. EU citizenship is the first of  these, followed by social and labour law and
policy, and by realising environmental protection. Over all three of  these themes, tensions
between EU-wide rights guarantees and legal frames of  integration on the one hand and
regional policies and national closure movements on the other emerge. These tensions are
epitomised by the EU’s rule of  law crisis and the challenges of  maintaining hybrid
territories and identities on the island of  Ireland after Brexit. 
Three articles engage with EU citizenship: as no other institutions, its introduction
evoked the question of  whether the peoples of  Europe – the category referred to in
Article 2(1) TEU – identify with the Union, and whether any such identification is
justified by the granting of  stable, consistent and reliable rights. 
Stephen Coutts asks which possible avenues for the future direction of  Union
citizenship remain open after the UK’s withdrawal, inter alia, on the grounds that ‘citizens
of  nowhere’ (Theresa May) were no longer countenanced. Instead of  focusing on the
individual fates of  the many citizens who relied on citizenship rights and moved to the
UK, the article asks the question whether Union citizenship as an additional category to
national citizenship is viable or rather contradicts ‘certain forms of  national social life’. It
contrasts communitarian with cosmopolitan citizenship concepts, finding that this
outworn dichotomy does little to resolve the dilemmas of  a multidimensional concept
such as Union citizenship. He finds the dichotomy to be useful in so far as it illuminates
the danger of  Union citizenship being of  use only for the privileged few.
Counterintuitively, he concludes that more rather than less citizenship will be needed to
overcome its social hollowness and inherent threat to national citizenship as an
institution. 
Massimo Fichera uses citizenship and free movement rights of  economically active
citizens as a case study for his hypothesis that the EU is fundamentally a security project.
In his conceptual definition of  security, the concept embraces the existential identity of
a polity. Guaranteeing the rule of  law, democracy and human rights thus become pure
instruments to safeguarding semantic, spatial, temporal and epistemic dimensions of
security. Applying these categories to the specific problems of  Union citizenship, Fichera
concludes that the EU as a security project requires differentiated integration. Extending
the options available under the concentric circles paradigm would in his view prevent
further disintegration as epitomised by Brexit. However, the challenge remains as to how
to ensure that differentiation does ‘not come at the expense of  the economic and social
constitution’, and in particular not at the expense of  social rights.
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45   Bongardt and Torres (n 3) 121.
Konstanze von Papp takes up the challenges of  also guaranteeing social citizenship
rights for those citizens who are frequently accused of  ‘benefit tourism’, a concept whose
empirical validity she rejects. Nevertheless, she recognises that Member States may find
difficulty in integrating EU citizens who are ‘economically inactive’ when they enter their
territory. She frames the question under which circumstances EU citizens from other
Member States must be granted equal treatment rights in relation to benefits as one of
federalism. This leads her to an extensive comparison of  case law (and legislation) in the
USA and the EU around the free movement rights of  the poor. This leads her to criticise
the much-debated Dano judgment of  the CJEU from a new angle. Concluding that there
is, indeed, the potential of  transnational solidarity in the EU, even in the alleged absence
of  a European ‘demos’, she nevertheless explores limits of  transnational financial
solidarity, concluding that EU-level ‘social engagement’ is required to overcome the
economic hurdles against integration of  poor movers. 
This line of  argument leads to the next theme, EU social and labour policy, which is
discussed in two articles. Konstantinos Alexandris Polomarkakis discusses the question of
whether the removal of  the UK as a veto player in social policy must be viewed as the
silver lining of  the Brexit cloud. Applying Tsebelis’ analytical framework, he explores the
UK’s veto player role in detail, distinguishing ideological, party policy-related and
Eurosceptic reasons for using a veto. Unsurprisingly, he comes to the conclusion that
there may well be other Member States stepping into the void left by the British veto.
Specifying his examination in relation to the diverse elements pursued under the Social
Pillar implementation, he comes to a sobering conclusion. On the positive side, he does
not find the same level of  ideologically supported social policy veto in other Member
States. However, states as different as Hungary, France and Germany are viewed as having
good reasons to veto some social policy measures on the basis of  party policy or
Euroscepticism. Nevertheless, the conclusion is cautiously optimistic in favour of  a slow
and steady realisation of  the Social Pillar, as long as abrupt changes of  national social
policy are not required of  Member States.
Łukasz Pisarczyk takes up the challenge of  discussing the future of  EU labour and
employment law from the perspective of  Poland as an Eastern EU country. His question
is similar to that asked by Polomarkakis: will social policy accelerate post-Brexit? His
prediction is that the Eastern Member States may well step into the alleged void left by
the UK as a veto player. In his view, this is due to the political perception of  comparative
(economic) advantage in these countries: often, the lower costs of  labour are still
perceived as decisive for remaining competitive. This, in turn, can lead to a reluctance to
embrace EU social standards which require change at national level. However, he also
notes that, as a result of  free movement rights for Polish workers, the government has
felt compelled to promote the return of  those highly skilled workers who were the first
to find better pastures in other EU countries. Among other strategies, the improvement
of  central employment conditions, such as the level of  the minimum wage at national
level, has been used to achieve that goal. Brexit may be perceived as a blessing in disguise
in this situation as Polish workers in the UK may no longer feel welcome there and
consider returning to Poland, while also weighing other options. 
Roderic O’Gorman discusses the challenges of  environmental protection through EU
law and policy post-Brexit. As pollution and other environmental problems do not tend
to stop at geographical borders, this is an area where the EU will be challenged to find a
new relationship with the UK which prevents undercutting of  standards and
transnational import of  environmental problems. Preferably, that regime would be as
efficient as EU membership itself  – but this option seems excluded. O’Gorman carefully
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develops the relevance of  oft-rehearsed relationship models such as ‘Swiss’, ‘Norwegian’,
Customs Union-only, and existing Association Agreements with neighbouring and other
non-EU countries. After duly highlighting the complex legal problems, he suggests that
an Association Agreement modelled upon the deep and comprehensive free trade
agreements with neighbourhood countries offers the best perspective of  respecting the
UK’s ‘red lines’ while not requiring the EU Member States to endure unregulated
pollution through water, air and land. The conclusion is bleak in that we must recognise
that no alternative to EU membership allows the same level of  protection as EU
membership itself. 
The last two articles in the issue take up the specific issue arising at the fringes of  the
EU in the wake of  Brexit. Robert Grzeszczak and Stephen Terrett explore the EU’s role
in policing the rule of  law, reflecting on the current Article 7(1) TEU procedure pending
against Poland. Maintaining functioning rule of  law institutions in Member States may
not appear immediately related to Brexit. However, as the Brexit vote has been viewed as
one expression of  right-wing populism’s successes, the connection is not at all far-
fetched. The dismantling of  judicial protection, and thus the precondition of  the
protection of  rights, seems eerily reminiscent of  one of  the UK government’s red lines
relating to judicial protection. Grzeszczak and Terrett argue that the current legal
framework for protecting the rule of  law in existing Member States is insufficient due to
structural inability of  the EU institutions to engage effectively with the threat to limit
membership rights. They illustrate their claim through a detailed account of  how the
Polish government has ‘debilitated’ the Polish Constitutional Court, concluding slightly
depressingly that the only hope is that, while the EU ‘waits the problem out’, Polish civil
society manages to challenge the government effectively. 
Dagmar Schiek takes up a problem at the Western fringe of  the EU, where Brexit is
discussed as a ‘border problem’ on the island of  Ireland, with additional challenges to the
protection of  human rights and equality rights. She challenges this perspective, identifying
instead that the UK’s withdrawal from the EU will hinder the hybridity of  identities and
territories on the island of  Ireland. Further, the focus on avoiding physical infrastructure
at the border overlooks the preconditions for socio-economic improvement in the lives
of  people in Northern Ireland, which depend on functioning legal frames for economic
and civic cooperation. Those rely on maintaining the direct effects of  EU economic
freedoms and citizenship rights. Identifying that the Protocol on Ireland/Northern
Ireland does not maintain all the economic freedoms, and relegates the citizenship rights
to the Common Travel Area, she concludes that the EU Commission, in focusing on the
physical infrastructure on the border and the formula of  ‘no diminution of  rights’, has
offered to give up the indivisibility of  the Internal Market for Northern Ireland alone.
This has not only reinforced the demand of  the UK to be allowed membership in the
Internal Market without free movement of  persons, but also does not satisfy the needs
of  Northern Ireland.
Conclusion
In debating the demands of  Brexit for the EU, a common thread of  the special issue has
emerged. Maintaining the EU’s social legitimacy requires taking citizenship rights as
seriously as the realisation of  the Pillar of  Social Rights. EU citizenship rights so far
encompass free movement of  workers underpinned by equal treatment rights – a concept
that today is challenged even by academics who have based their careers on defending it
prior to Brexit. Areas as different as environmental protection, rule of  law and the
situation on the island of  Ireland further underline the importance of  maintaining judicial
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enforceability of  EU rights after Brexit. From socio-legal perspectives, all this sounds like
squaring a number of  circles. On a positive note, this offers extensive opportunities for
socio-legal research, not only up to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, but also beyond
this point in relation to redefining citizenship rights, as well as social dimensions of
economic freedoms, the safeguarding of  efficient environmental protection and social
and employment rights in the post-Brexit EU. 
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